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People who endure mental and emotional distress experience a plethora of negative
experiences  beyond  the  effects  of  the  symptoms themselves.  For  centuries,  the
designation of labels of difference; that is, those which transgress approved social
norms, have affected the lived experiences of those individuals, and more widely in
structuring responses,  engagements  with,  and attitudes between society  and the
individual. Understanding the creation of tainted identities, particularly of those with
experience  of  mental  and  emotional  distress  have  been  well  rehearsed  in  the
sociological literature of the second half of the twentieth century. Central to much of
this  analysis  has  been  to  understand  the  nature  of  the  manufacture  of  deviant
identities, how they are sustained and the impact of these identities on those who
experience  them.  This  paper  explores  the  experience  of  those  with  mental  and
emotional distress as a victim of crime. The interconnectedness of matters of identity
created though the application of a diagnosis of illness/disorder is addressed as is
the  crisis  of  criminal  victimisation.  This  is  achieved  via  an  exploration  of
contemporary concerns surrounding victims of crime with experience of mental and
emotional distress, including the (further) loss of voice and agency when interfacing
with agencies of the State.
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INTRODUCTION
Communication  between one another  is  imbued with  meaning,  and assumptions
over the quality, acceptability and reliability of the dialogue. Interaction may be a site
of differential power relations, prejudice and discrimination. Treatment of the person
who provides the testimony is  a  matter  for  critical  consideration.  ‘Good’  or  ‘bad’
informants are subjectively constructed by the ‘hearer’, not least based on the social
group  from  which  they  may  emerge.  Knowledge  production  may  be  tainted  by
underlying assumptions, prejudices and attempts to discredit the testimony of the
knower. Marginalised groups, where inequalities may exist, are prime victims of such
epistemic injustice. Evaluations of any testimony are wedded to beliefs held about
the individual which may be influenced by an interpretation of the social membership
or social standing of a wider group, culminating in stereotyping behaviours on the
part of the hearer.
The  voices  of  crime  victims  have  traditionally  been  subordinate,  with  little
understanding of their overarching needs either pre- or post-trial, lack of appropriate
and current information, and limited understanding of Crown Prosecution Service
guidance (Home Office, 1998). Further, the criminal justice system has tended to
marginalise victims, notwithstanding their significance to the process. Meanwhile, the
“objective  of  cross-examination  in  our  adversarial  system  is  to  persuade  the
opposition’s  witnesses  to  change  their  version  of  events  or  to  discredit  their
evidence” (Plotnikoff & Wilson, 2015: 156). 
 Historically,  the  voices of  people  with  experience of  mental  and emotional
distress have also been subordinate. The Enlightenment’s obsession with reason
and the ‘mentally ill’ as a scourge on society, to be placed in large institutions in an
act of social exclusion (Foucault, 1971), resulted in phenomenological emphasis on
the individual in the twentieth century. Uncritical acceptance amongst the psychiatric
and psychotherapeutic professions that emotional  distress could be dealt  with by
focusing on ‘intense self-examination’, meant that the context in which that distress
emerged,  could  be  disregarded.  Currently,  individuals  with  the  stigma of  ‘mental
illness’  may  either  be  locked  up,  coerced  into  taking  ever  more  complex
combinations  of  drugs  or  ‘requested’  to  undergo  electroconvulsive  therapy.
Additionally, the straightjacket of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, with emphasis on
‘neurological dysfunction’ which can be cured with drugs, is legitimated by the state
(Bracken, 2001).
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Combining  the  subordination  of  the  voices  of  crime  and  those  who  have
experienced mental  and emotional  distress,  results  in  double  deviance;  whereby
individuals are treated more harshly by the criminal justice system as a consequence
of  their  deviation  from  social  norms.  In  this  article,  we  explore  and  further  the
empirical evidence provided by Pettitt, et al.’s (2013) (also see Khalifeh et al., 2015;
Koskela, Pettitt & Drennan, 2016) who have drawn attention to the experiences of
those with a history of mental health problems who have been victims of crime. In
doing  so,  a  conceptual  positioning  of  the  identity  and  voice  of  the  person  is
undertaken,  drawing  influence from the  work  of  Miranda Fricker  (2007).  Broadly
speaking, Fricker is concerned with the exercise of social power, whereby the least
powerful can be silenced and dispossessed. In our application of Fricker’s work to
Pettitt et al’s findings, silence results from having experienced mental and emotional
distress  and  falling  ‘victim’  to  crime  in  a  system  which  negatively  and  yet
imperceptibly, constrains those judged as lacking credibility from the perspective of
the hearer; otherwise known as epistemic injustice.
CRIME AND VICTIMISATION
Crime in England and Wales
Accurately drawing a picture of the extent of crime in a given jurisdiction is, however,
difficult. Survey methods are invariably skewed in directions based on the proficiency
and  approach  to  recording.  Moreover,  multiple  methodologies  are  frequently
employed  to  collate  information;  often  residing  in  multiple  agencies.  In  the  year
ending March 2016, the Office for National Statistics recorded crime against adults in
England and Wales standing at 6.3million. Analysis points to a general trend of crime
rates falling; however, some offence types continue to grow or remain largely static. 
What the public know about crime, and its extent, is more often an amalgam of
influences, representations and sometimes experience. Typically,  headline figures
are drawn from crime data for the purposes of political speech writing media news
reports  on  the  blight  of  criminality  in  communities,  or  as  the  basis  for  fictive
entertainment. Moreover, the represented extent of crime can never account for a
true figure,  not  least  due to  the unwillingness or  difficulties in reporting crime or
victimisation.  Taken  for  what  they  are,  official  crime  statistics  do  offer  some
advantages for  authorities  such as:  fulfilling obligations to  evaluate performance;
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indicating demographic characteristics of suspects, defendants and offenders in the
criminal  justice  process (which  can be  useful  in  formulating  critical  questioning);
informing and shaping policies of law and order by means of an empirical  base;
providing an accessible source of information on crime which the public can readily
access and therefore fulfilling, in part,  obligations for transparency in the criminal
justice system.
Counting crime is challenging, and thus the argument of the practical usefulness
of official  crime statistics is brought to bear.  Non-disclosure of crime to agencies
such as the police is  a  continuing example,  and several  studies have sought  to
unveil  the  significance of  this,  based on issues such as  perceptions of  how the
victim’s initial testimony would be received and handled by authorities. Further, some
crimes are recorded whilst others may not be in line with official mandates on crime
recording (Cook, 1997, 2006). This, coupled with the decision making of victims in
reporting  or  not  reporting  filters  official  crime  statistics  down  a  path  of  being  a
constructed reality (Morrison, 1995).
A ‘victim-focused’ criminal justice system has been a key objective for a number
of decades. In 2002 the then Labour government published the White Paper Justice
for All. This aimed to deliberately recalibrate the criminal justice system; putting the
victim  at  its  ‘heart’.  Engaging  with  victims  of  crime  was  a  key  strand  of  this
document, and its influence made some changes to various aspects of pre and post-
trial  processes,  practices of  agencies  delivering  criminal  justice services  and the
general positioning of the victim in political and criminal justice policy, rhetoric and
discourse. However, there is evidence of victim-orientated strategies pre-dating the
beginning of the new millennia. The British Crime Survey (BCS) was first in use in
1982.  This  survey  aimed  to  capture  insights  into  victimisation,  and  fear  of
victimisation.  This  ‘in-home’  surveying  method,  delivered  by  the  Home  Office,
provided data on victimisation and attitudes towards crime from households in Britain
(participants over 16 years of age). However, the paucity of evidence has marked
the evolving history of the BCS into its current form today (now called Crime Survey
for England and Wales) for similar concerns as official crime statistics, that is for
example: that not all crimes may be included; victimisation age thresholds/limits of
participation; problems accounting for non-direct victimisation; participant’s residency
situation.
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What  we  know  from  crime  surveys  and  statistics  is  that  it  is  invariably  a
challenging enterprise to understand the extent of crime from these methods alone.
A myopic view of crime is conjured up if a reliance is placed on crime data alone.
While moving beyond quantitative/evaluative territories is a must, it is important to
recognise vulnerabilities that exist; in that crime data does have a seismic presence
in the reform, revision and commissioning of service arrangements for victims of
crime. Distortion of data, partial views of the ‘crime problem’, the constructed nature
of crime itself (and the statistics that represent it) pose formidable challenges for all
concerned.
The changing role of the victim in the criminal justice process
Richard  Quinney  (1972:  315)  eminently  states  that  “if  a  victim  cannot  be
imagined,  a  criminal  law  is  neither  created  nor  enforced”.  Here  Quinney  draws
attention to  the  necessity  of  understanding complexities  in  relationships between
harms, crimes and victims.  What these three each represent is a contested domain;
in particular the scholarly criticisms which exist set against precedents of legislature,
policy and criminal justice practice. The significance, nature and character of these
facets in criminal law and practice shape the experience of victims of crime. How the
victim  is  interpreted  in  procedural  matters  of  criminal  justice,  how  they  are
recognised and treated, and how harms and crimes are defined, all have a bearing
on just how victim-orientated a criminal justice system may be. Definitions of the
victim, what rights should be afforded to victims, how a victim’s needs may be met,
and how outcomes of these analyses interact with due process and human rights,
are illustrative of inquisitions that engulf criminal justice policy strategists and critical
commentators alike.
Amidst  concerns  that  victims  of  crime  are  not  accorded  sufficient
acknowledgement  in  criminal  justice  processes,  one  of  the  first  official  defining
documents emerged in 1985 - United Nations (UN) General Assembly’s Declaration
of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power.  The UN
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice passed a resolution in 1996
to create a manual for victims, followed by the publication of a Handbook on Justice
for Victims in 1999. Campaigning by victims’ movement had already been gathering
momentum domestically,  as  seen in  the  publication  in  1990 and 1996 of  Victim
Charters.  These  Charters  set  standards  of  service  that  victims  can  expect  from
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criminal  justice agencies.  However,  as campaign groups such as Liberty  Human
Rights  state,  whilst  these  were  well  intentioned,  there  remained  an  absence  of
legally enforceable rights for victims of crime. The first statutory rights that victims of
crime could receive came in 2004 with the Crown assent of the Domestic Violence,
Crime and Victims Act. Obligations of criminal justice agencies such as the police
were outlined in  the 2005  Code of  Practice for  Victims of  Crime,  with  a revised
version of the Code being published in 2013.
The  plight  of  the  victim of  crime  in  the  criminal  justice  process  has  been  a
precarious one. The victim of crime has become highly politicised, and whilst victims
may have received rights, they are indeed limited by the potential for discrepancy
between  policy  and  practice.  Much  work  continues  in  the  UK and  elsewhere  to
continue to orientate criminal justice policy and practice that is victim-sensitive.
MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND CRIMINAL VICTIMISATION
Those with  experience of  mental  and emotional  distress  are  often  subject  to
pejorative  stereotyping.  Terminology  can  be  a  potentially  contentious  subject;
‘mental illness’, utilised by psychological and psychiatric services for those requiring
medical treatment carries with it a stigma for many survivors. For the purposes of
this  study,  ‘people  with  experience  of  mental  and  emotional  distress’,  focuses
attention  on  the  individual’s  expertise  about  their  own  mental  health,  and
emphasises the person over the psychiatric diagnosis.  As Mason and Mercer (2014)
highlight, individuals with experience of mental and emotional distress have been
normatively  associated  with  traits  and  behaviours  attributed  to  riskiness,
unpredictability,  violence and dangerousness.  These popular  associations  are  an
embedded feature of contemporary social  understandings of mental  illness.   The
falsehood of this causality fails to accrue a sufficient status in the face of media
portrayals,  or  the  application  of  a  medical  model  to  offending  behaviour,  and
reductionist explanations that malfunctioning minds cause abnormal behaviours (and
vice versa), as well as the failure to incorporate anti-stigma tenets into policy and
legislative  developments.  The reason that  it  is  crucial  to  emphasise  this  socially
constructed view of the ‘mentally ill’ as dangerous here is that it is entirely bogus,
exaggerated  and  serves  to  misinform  the  public  audience.  The  long  history  of
representations  and  dialogue  of  association  between  people  with  experience  of
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mental and emotional distress and criminality continue to pervade media of all types
- factual and fictional depictions (see Morley & Taylor, 2016) - gaining a prominence
in the lexicon of social groups who pose a risk or threat to the safety and values of a
society.
These misrepresentations are perverse. They are perverse because there is no
credible evidence to suggest that those with experience of mental and emotional
distress are any more violent or susceptible to committing a criminal act than those
without.  Further,  in  the  UK,  the  National  Confidential  Inquiry  into  Suicide  and
Homicide by People with Mental Illness illustrates a small percentage of homicides
are  perpetrated  by  offender-patients.  The  saddening  truth  of  misrepresentation
continues in that authors such as Peay (2011) reveal that in all likelihood those with
‘mental  illness’  are  more  likely  to  be  a  victim of  crime  than  a  perpetrator  of  it.
Difficulties remain in understanding the extent and nature of criminal victimisation
among those with experience of mental and emotional distress, as such information
is not recorded centrally. However, studies such as those presented by Pettitt et al.
(2013), Khalifeh et al (2015) and Koskela, Pettitt and Drennan, (2016) reveal much
about experience at various stages of the criminal justice process.
Several pieces of scholarship exist that aim to highlight the criminal victimisation
of those with ‘severe mental illness’ (see Maniglio, 2008 for a systematic review).
Violent victimisation has been noted as substantial (Hiday et al., 1999), with higher
levels of victimisation when compared to national trends (Teplin et al., 2005; Hodgins
et al., 2007). Those with psychotic conditions are considered more at risk of violent
victimisation  (Walsh  et  al.,  2003),  with  homelessness  and  a  co-morbidity  of
psychosis  and  alcohol  abuse  resulting  in  a  higher  risk  of  victimisation  (Lam  &
Rosenheck, 1998), and a high prevalence of sexual violence against women with
severe mental illness (Goodman et al., 2001). There is, however, a paucity of insight
into the experience of engagement of those with severe mental illness and criminal
justice agencies. 
This dearth of  enquiry has been addressed more recently in the UK with the
publication of At risk, yet dismissed: The criminal victimisation of people with mental
health problems (Pettitt et al., 2013). This jointly commissioned research report by
charities Victim Support and Mind provided a timely portrait of criminal victimisation
and the victim of crime’s interactions with the criminal justice system. The research
adopted  both  quantitative  survey  methods  and  qualitative  interview  and  focus
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groups. It sampled 361 people with severe mental illness who were using community
mental  health  services  in  London.  A  modified  version  of  the  Crime  Survey  for
England and Wales (CSEW) was used and compared with a general population of
London  who  had  completed  the  CSEW  in  the  same  time  period.  Eighty-one
qualitative interviews were conducted. All interviewees had been a victim of crime in
the last three years and had mental health problems.
Pettitt et al. (2013) found that people with severe mental illness were five times
more  likely  to  be  a  victim  of  household  crime  than  the  general  public,  after
accounting for  socio-demographic differences.  The findings show that  those with
severe mental illness are just as likely to report their victimisation to the police and
move  through  the  various  stages  of  the  criminal  justice  system as  those  in  the
general population. However, what this study does highlight are troubling views on
satisfaction of  victims with mental  health problems when interacting with criminal
justice agencies. Pettitt et al (2013) report that many who participated in research
interviews had been in contact (as suspect/offender, through processes of detention
under the Mental Health Act, and/or victim or witness) with the police before, and
that these experiences prompted a reluctance to engage with the police in the case
of victimisation. The study examined some of the specific reasons why there may be
a disinclination to report victimisation to the police. Pettitt and colleagues report that
participants spoke of the fear of a negative response from the police on the grounds
of:  fearing being blamed for  the incident;  not  being taken seriously;  fear of  their
mental health condition being used as a basis for the police to disbelieve or discredit
them; and fear that they may be detained under the Mental Health Act for reporting a
crime against themselves. Further,  the study reported views of some participants
who claimed that poor experience with the police was due to prejudice or the police
being misinformed about mental health problems. Some participants reported that
they believed their  case was dropped because they had mental  health  problems
whilst  others  reported  that  the  police  had  told  them  that  they  were  unreliable
witnesses due to their mental health problem. Contact with perpetrators through the
courts,  and  being  cross-examined  were  reported  as  distressing  incidents  of  the
process. Moreover, a participant in Pettitt et al’s. (2013) study described how the use
of a mental health history in the courts was used to discredit his personal testimony.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF TESTIMONY AND VOICE
Testimony is an intrinsic feature of human interaction. As human beings, we interact
with one another through a variety of communicative strategies, not least speech and
listening. We story-tell on an ongoing basis recounting memories and synthesising
ideas,  articulating perspectives on experience and communicating viewpoints.  As
recipients  (or  listeners)  of  people’s  testimony  we  construct  and  attach  meaning.
Testimonies are important conduits of experience of both things which are real and
imagined (Plummer, 2001). Testimony, (auto)biography and voice have been widely
theorised in the social research methods domain. Here we see a deliberate critique
and a drawing of attention towards what is not a uniformity in how testimonies and
people’s voices are heard or listened too. Indeed, many scholars have reasoned that
some testimonies accrue more importance in the social and intellectual field than
others (see for  example,  Plummer’s  work  on sex workers  Telling  Sexual  Stories
(2002)). Subjugation and the culturally accepted suppressing of personal testimony
based on variants such as social  class, gender, race, sexuality and status is not
uncommon. Pickering (2003), in her analysis of feminist perspectives on this subject,
indicates that ‘expert’ testimonies often take precedence and personal testimonies
subordinated.  Personal testimonies are sites of power struggles of status. Who is
providing the testimony, and who is the recipient may well be a starting point of how
the form of the testimony is sculpted by the teller, and how the story is heard or
acted upon by the listener; the nature of this interaction determines the amount of
agency that the teller has. 
Biography is closely tied to the communication of testimonies. As Shantz (2009:
117)  describes  in  an  analysis  of  biographical  sociology,  individual  identities  are
“complex composites of who they create themselves to be and present to the world,
and who that world makes and constrains them to be”. The biography of the story-
teller  and  the  delivery  of  their  testimony  are  a  constructed  phenomenon.  The
authenticity of the testimony may be questioned by the listener amidst observations
and  discrimination  against  the  person’s  biography.  The  way  that  the  story  is
recounted or used by the listener may maintain orthodoxies attributed to others who
share similar biographical characteristics. In sum, the process of interaction where a
testimony is delivered may be value and status laden. Any discrimination afforded to
the teller is an assault on the authenticity of the testimony. Plummer (2001, 2002)
lends support to the claim that stories are crucial in inspiring a moral imagination
10
whereby they can aid critiques of a damaged world, stimulate dialogue, stimulate
empathy and deepen our sympathies. Respecting the identity of the speaker, and
the testimony itself are central to challenging differential power relations, not least
where  testimonies  are  a  principal  feature  of  help  seeking  and  support  between
individuals and agencies or offices of the state.
Testimonies and voices of less eligibility: mental illness
Mental illness, whether conceived of as a socially or biologically constructed (or
both) condition represents an identity for the holder of social deviance. They have,
through the processes of medicalisation been labelled (ab)normal/(sub)normal. Many
with  experience of  mental  and emotional  distress  have been the  recipients  of  a
ferocious and sustained attack on their moral standing against ‘normal’ society. They
have been met with, and continue to attract, suspicion, discrimination, prejudice and
stigmatisation. Social attitudes, medical expertise, political action and media fallacies
have perpetuated a nomenclature surrounding the mentally ill as subnormal, morally
defective, pitiful, potentially threatening and in need of control (Cohen, 1985). The
crisis that those with mental illness experience is not simply confined to symptoms or
episodes of illness, but rather also is characterised by a repression of their standing
as equal in everyday life. A rich vein of scholarship exists on the subject of mental
illness and stigma (see for example, Fink & Tasman, 1992; Mason et al.,  2001).
Social  divisions  based  on  social  deviance  are  common,  and  are  a  damning
indictment on societies which lack cohesion and favour separatism. Stigma is about
identity and the process of how that identity may be discredited or disgraced and set
apart (Goffman, 1963). Stigma may be public, or directed at oneself (see Corrigan et
al, 2003). It is a process of stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination and is very
much a moral experience whereby the individual’s identity is earmarked or embodied
as  tainted,  spoiled  or  discounted.  The  deviant  self  and  the  social  identity  is
constructed  as  an  outcome  of  stereotyping,  agreements  with  the  stereotype
(prejudice)  and  adverse  responses  to  the  prejudice  (discrimination)  (Corrigan  &
Watson, 2002). 
Theorists such as Scheff (1974, 2013) have discussed the outcomes of negative
labelling; in particular conditions that arise where access to a ‘valued’ social status is
compromised.  Access  to  employment  opportunities,  social  marginalisation,
problematic social mobility, and a general level of social rejection characterise the
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lives  of  many who have experienced mental  and emotional  distress  (Rosenfield,
1997). Moreover, arguments have been advanced that suggest this stigma may lead
to  increases  in  symptoms  of  psychological  distress  (Link  et  al.,  2001)  and  the
trapping of individuals in a sustained pattern of social deviance (Scheff, 1974; Thoits,
1985).  Indeed,  stigma  scholars  have  asserted  that  the  false  assumptions  and
discrediting of  the identity  and voice of  the mentally  ill  is  more harmful  than the
illness itself (Overton & Medina, 2008). 
Power  is  important  in  any  analysis  of  stigma.  Deviant  labels  can  only  be
conferred  (and  sustained)  in  situations  of  power  and  powerlessness.  Link  and
Phelan (2001: 382) reason that ‘labelling, stereotyping, separating, status loss, and
discrimination co-occur in a power situation that allows these processes to unfold’.
Medical power, political power, the power of the media to name but a few, structure
the  outcomes  of  stigma  for  those  who  have  experienced  mental  and  emotional
distress. Their voice is not only suppressed by external influence, but by conditions
of rejection, devaluing and discrediting, which translate into an embodied experience
(self-stigma), affecting the individual’s belief that they may be legitimate or that they
lack  agency  to  fight  stereotyping,  prejudice  and  discrimination  -  this  is  a  truly
remarkable example of the power that exists in this context.
Testimonies and voices of less eligibility - crime victims
Not all victims are constructed as such and not all victims are responded to as such.
Accordingly, victims are constructed along a continuum from that of the ‘deserving’
victim to that of the ‘underserving’ victim (Walklate, 2014). The ‘deserving’ victim find
themselves in a position where their victimisation is acknowledged and thus awarded
victim  status  as  well  as  public,  practitioner,  political,  institutional  and  media
sympathy. While the ‘underserving’ victim is denied victim status, media attention
and public and political support and sympathy.  As Goodey (2005: 124) eloquently
highlights “victims whose character, past conduct or actions can be considered as
undesirable,  or  somehow  contributing  to  their  victimisation,  are  unlikely  to  be
responded to sympathetically by the criminal justice system as deserving victims with
particular  needs to  be met”.  These needs include having  their  voices as victims
accepted as valid accounts of the events of their victimisation. 
Where a victim lies on this continuum depends on a number of subjective and
objective factors. Subjective factors include, but are not limited to, the nature of the
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crime, the severity of the harm inflicted and, the frequency with which the harm is
inflicted. It also includes factors such as gender, age, sexuality, race and, ethnicity;
these characteristics may also have an impact upon how the victim experiences the
crime and the subsequent support they require. Indeed, victims may find that their
experiences are impacted by their knowledge of and, their ability or willingness to
engage with criminal justice processes in seeking redress for the crime. Objective
factors include, whether the harm the person has suffered is deemed to be criminal
by themselves and/or criminal justice agencies, whether the harm suffered by the
victim is perceived to be worthy of the attention of criminal justice agencies, the level
of blameworthiness attributed to the victim and, the level of cooperation from the
victim with the various agencies involved including the criminal justice process.
 Christie  (1986)  recognised  that  the  process  of  acquiring  victim  status  is
informed by an understanding of the ‘ideal victim’. This understanding is premised on
the notion of the ‘deserving’ or undeserving’ victim which in turn impacts on statutory
and social  acceptance of  victimisation.  According to  Christie,  the ‘ideal’  victim is
weak in relation to the offender; is going about their everyday, legitimate activities;
blameless for the crime/harm inflicted upon them; is unrelated to the offender, who is
opposite to the offender in terms of stature and physic, that is, slight and slender in
comparison  to  the  big  and  bad  offender  and;  able  to  elicit  sympathy  for  the
crime/harm inflicted upon them. This characterisation of the ‘ideal’ victim provides
clear  distinctions  between  the  victim  and  offender.  Therefore,  victims  who  are
perceived  to  be  members  of  socially  marginalised  groups,  such  as  people  with
mental  health  problems,  find  themselves  occupying  the  lower  echelons  of  the
hierarchy of victimisation.  This prompted Carrabine et al. (2009) to highlight how
some victims of crime are more visible while others are more invisible, with the latter
being implicated in their victimisation hence having their victim status invalidated.
This is particularly evident when people with mental health problems are the victims
of crime. 
SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE
Pettitt et al.’s (2013) study into the experiences of those with mental health problems
and  the  criminal  justice  process  provides  a  stark  reminder  of  a  variance  of
experience in the interface of individuals and agencies of the state.  As we have
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observed  in  previous  sections  of  this  paper,  those  with  mental  illness  have
historically struggled to compete as full citizens, worthy of respect, consideration and
trust, due to structural inequalities created by social institutions and public opinion.
Moreover, the crime victim has also experienced an impoverishment of their voice in
the criminal justice process. Active membership and a full protection of rights in a
process for crime victims has long been a matter of concern along with what had
been considered as a lack of victim-sensitive policies and practice; indeed, as some
of the critical literature points towards, for many years the crime victim may merely
be a ‘rhetorical’ victim (Davis & Smith, 1994; Bottoms & Roberts, 2011)
Those who endure mental illness, and have been a victim of crime, fall into both
categories.  As  such  there  is  real  potential  that  their  experience  of  the  crime  is
worsened by the response of the criminal justice system. Pettitt et al.’s (2013) study
draws attention to the suspicions that crime victims have, over the potential less-
than-desirable  outcomes  that  may  occur.  Many  of  these  appear  rooted  in
discriminatory practices where the individual’s  identity  as having a mental  health
‘problem’  structures  customary  or  institutional  practices.  Conceptually  and
practically, the crime victim who endures a mental ‘illness’ or ‘problem’ therefore is in
receipt of an identity of double-deviance which invariably structures the experience.
As we try to understand this phenomenon in more precise detail, our attention
can be drawn to the processes at work, whereby the crime victim with ‘mental illness’
finds their voice and as a consequence their testimony has become one of deficit. To
apply this here, we have deployed a conceptual framework put forward by Mirander
Fricker  in  her  2007  text  Epistemic  Injustice:  Power  and  the  Ethics  of  Knowing.
Fricker’s intention is to  outline,  from a philosophical  standpoint,  the intricacies of
how, and in what ways, ‘knowers’ (those providing a testimony) are wronged; Fricker
labels this as epistemic injustice. Other studies (see Carel & Kidd, 2014) make a
substantial contribution to this area of thinking when applied to examples. Carel and
Kidd (2014) have expertly applied Fricker’s analysis to illness and healthcare, and in
doing so, offer rich opportunities through recommendations to enhance approaches
in  practice.  The  intention  here  is  the  same;  drawing  attention  towards  the  dual
identities in our example via this heuristic device of analysis. Below, we will outline
how Fricker’s perspective offers value to elucidate our area of interest; by exploring
her  two  stands  of  epistemic  injustice;  testimonial  injustice  and  hermeneutical
injustice. 
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Testimonial  injustice  is  one  aspect  of  Fricker’s  (2007)  theory  of  epistemic
injustice. Based on the premise of that there is a deficit in the testimony of a knower,
testimonial injustice seeks to explore this phenomenon. Inextricably linked to this is
power, and importantly the manner in which prejudices and discrimination filter into
interactions.  Credibility  of  the  knower  is  brought  into  question  and,  as  we  have
described in previous sections, for the crime victim who has experience of mental
and emotional distress, the aetiology of their social identity is bound to historical,
customary  and  ongoing  stereotyping,  discrimination  and  prejudice  that  bar  that
person from accessing a status of equal value in society. Dismissal (by listeners) of
contributions made by the knower formulate the basis of testimonial injustice, often
aligned to assumptions made about the social group that the knower emerges from.
Fricker and others add that this issue is not simply about an individual, but also their
social demographic attachment, through analyses of race and ethnicity. Victims of
crime have long felt a sense of being ‘silenced’ in the criminal justice process. The
testimony of those with mental health problems has, and arguably, continues to be
cast as less important when set against professional  or scientific  judgement (not
least through the development of mental health legislation and policy which resists
opportunities  to  incorporate  further  patient  choice  -  see  Mental  Health  Alliance,
2012).  Giving  less  importance  to  a  crime  victim with  mental  health  problems  is
clearly illustrated in the examples put forward in this paper drawn from Pettitt et al.’s
(2013)  study.  In  court,  a  victim of  crime  recounted  the  time  where  under  cross
examination their testimony was set against a backcloth of a mental health medical
history disclosure - doing so reinforced prejudices in the minds of the audience also.
Deflating the credibility of the source of knowledge is problematic, as this not only
affects the experience of the knower (for example, in Pettitt  et  al.’s  (2013) study
participants reported that they were disinclined to report victimisation to the police
because they feared that they would not be taken seriously), but also what is known.
Hermeneutics,  rooted  in  continental  philosophical  works  by  those  such  as
Gadamer (2004), refers to the methods of interpretation. Language is the vehicle by
which understanding can be made and also a primary means of sharing what are
often complex human experiences (Gadamer,  2004).  This  process allows for the
creation  of  concepts  and  understanding,  with  certain  experiences  having  a
conceptual  relevance  and  vocabulary  attached.  However,  not  all  experience  is
necessarily  translated  into  such  concepts.  Social  sciences  have  vehemently
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attempted to address such an imbalance; in particular, for those whose experience is
complex, and implicated in social structures, and for voices of experience which are
perhaps less-heard.  Hermeneutical  injustice occurs,  as Fricker (2007)  postulates,
where there is an inability of those, in particular from marginalised groups, to be able
to  actively  express,  reveal  and communicate  their  injustice,  because there  is  no
conceptual  principle  to  encapsulate  their  experience  situated  in  the  collective
consciousness of a given society.
According  to  Fricker  (2007),  two  kinds  of  hermeneutical  injustice  exist;
incidental and systematic. The first involves experience remaining obscure because
of a gap in; “the collective hermeneutical resource” (2007: 158), and the second,
additionally, involving an all-encompassing, pervasive hermeneutical marginalization.
Hermeneutical injustice only takes place when the individual attempts unsuccessfully
to make sense of their  experience. Beeby (2011: 485) takes issue with Fricker’s
(2007) account on the grounds that hermeneutical injustice might also apply to the
perpetrator, and suggests that hermeneutical injustice be reframed in order to give
emphasis  to  epistemic  injustice  and  provide  “a  more  nuanced  field  of  debate”.
However,  Jenkins’  (2016)  erudite  paper  reiterates  Fricker’s  position  that
hermeneutical  injustice  is  a  specific  form  of  epistemic  injustice  whereby  an
individual’s social experience is obscured because of hermeneutical marginalisation. 
In 1998, a report, ‘Speaking up for Justice’, highlighted that victims/witnesses
“should not be denied the emotional support and counselling they may need both
before and after the trial” (HO, 1998) However, in 2013, Frances Andrade died after
giving evidence at a sex abuse trial of her former teacher. The serious case review
(Surrey Safeguarding Adults Board, 2014) concluded that she had been seriously let
down by mental health services. Fricker would argue that Andrade was let down by
the establishment because her lack of knowledge precluded her from understanding
and protesting against her situation. The fact that she was under the impression that
she was not entitled to emotional support, and the court was unaware of the fragility
of her mental health, exemplifies how mental and emotional distress has tended to
be hidden from sight, literally and figuratively. However, with an economic cost to the
UK  of  £70-£100  billion  a  year  (Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and
Development,  2014),  more needs to  be done to  protect  the needs of  vulnerable
people. For this is set against a backdrop of significant failings in community care,
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and unwavering faith until  recently in the ability of mental health professionals to
resolve human and social problems. 
Whether  this  is  a  situation  of  incidental  hermeneutical  injustice  or  systemic
hermeneutical marginalisation is open to question. However, Jenkins (2016) argues
that  Fricker’s  (2007)  account  of  hermeneutical  injustice  can  be  applied  to  the
phenomenon of persistent myths and social misconceptions, and uses the example
of sexual and domestic violence as a case in point, with the idea that if the individual
did not fight back it is not rape, thus obscuring individual understanding of their own
experiences.  In  this  paper,  it  is  argued  that  the  mental  health  implications  of
domestic violence are well  established (Herman, 1997; Roddy,  2015),  which can
engender depression, suicidal ideation, posttraumatic stress disorder and abrogation
of  trust.  The definition of  hermeneutical  injustice,  for  Jenkins (2016:  7),  includes
three elements;  “the experience being  significant,  the experience being  obscured
from collective understanding, and the subject being hermeneutically marginalized”.
Individual experience of mental and emotional distress is necessarily significant in
the event of being the victim of crime; understanding the significance of what has
happened determining whether they seek support.   In terms of experience being
obscured from collective understanding, common misconceptions about mental and
emotional  distress  have  meant  that  pre-trial  therapy  has  often  been  denied  if  a
prosecution is pending; for fear that it might taint evidence, involve witness coaching
or undermine the credibility of the witness. Additionally, discussion about the content
of evidence before a trial has historically given rise to questions about the victim’s
evidence. Although intermediaries can be called upon to assist vulnerable individuals
who have been victims of crime (Criminal Justice Act 1999), and live link cameras
have been instituted to mitigate anxiety, these are subject to economic vicissitudes.
Advocacy training has been highlighted as essential  (Advocacy Training Council,
2011)  for  supporting  vulnerable  people  in  court,  following  recent  controversy
surrounding  child  sexual  exploitation  cases,  as  a  means  of  responding  to  past
injustices for people with experiences of domestic and emotional distress who have
been victims of crime. However, only a few ad hoc training events were held in 2014
indicating that little has changed for witnesses in terms of needing to respond to
leading questions, or the practice of ‘tag questions’, which serve only to confuse
vulnerable witnesses and engender ‘unreliable’  responses (Plotnikoff  & Woolfson,
2015).  Moreover, the third element, hermeneutical marginalisation, whereby victims
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of  crime  also  carry  the  stigma  of  experience  of  mental  and  emotional  distress,
increases  their  chances  of  being  perceived  as  being  to  blame  for  the  crime
perpetrated against them, by those in dominant social positions. Further, it reduces
ability to make sense of their own experience and communicate it to others, and may
even be epistemically disadvantaging (Jenkins, 2016) to people with experience of
mental and emotional distress, who may have no suitable concept of victimisation.
Fricker’s concept of hermeneutical breakthrough is nonetheless encapsulated
within  The  Hearing  Voices  Network,  established  by  Romme,  following  her
disenfranchised client’s ‘Aha’ moment, when she communicates her own experience
of  hearing  voices  as  an  understandable  consequence  of  social  and  political
disadvantage. Until this time, hallucinations were only regarded as having meaning
as symptoms of mental illness, which Hayes (2011) reports meant that; ‘Emotional
and interpersonal aspects of the experiences are either irrelevant, or triggers for an
essentially meaningless process’ (2011: 21), while contextual factors are ignored.
Inevitably, it is, as Jenkins (2016) argues, the prevalence of myths such as these
that constitute ‘an injustice in and of itself’ (2011: 12)
Apropos to the issues outlined above,  it  is  worthwhile  to consider that  self-
stigma too  plays  an  important  part  in  constructing  epistemic  injustice.  We  have
drawn attention  towards the  issue of  self-stigma earlier  in  this  paper;  a  process
whereby,  as  applied  to  those  with  mental  health  problems,  individuals  have  an
awareness of the stereotype, agree with it, and apply it to one’s self (see Corrigan,
Larson  &  Ruesch,  2009).  This  is  important  in  the  context  of  mental  illness  and
Fricker’s (2007) ideas on epistemic injustice.  What self-stigma represents is self-
directed prejudice. This may manifest in a number of ways for the crime victim with
mental  illness.  They  imbue  their  testimony  with  reticence  or  through  interaction
present as self-effacing. Any acceptance of stereotypes of deviant labels which the
individual may hold invariably structures the interchange between themselves and
services.  These  feelings  and  experiences  may  influence  decisions  to  report
victimisation to the police. If they do engage with criminal justice agencies then the
character of the interaction may be governed by an individual’s interpretation of their
social standing (which may be embodied as being powerless in the face of powerful
social forces which have created them already as deviant) which plays out as self-
effacement  occasioned  by  poor  self-confidence,  low  self-esteem  and  low  self-
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efficacy. This too is testimonial injustice, but in this case it is contributed to by the
knower through no fault of their own.
CONCLUSIONS
This  paper  originated as  a  response  to  the  idea that  people  with  experience  of
mental and emotional distress who have been the victim of crime need support in the
form of radical change in order to find their voice. It is feasible that changes made to
the Criminal Justice System and health care professions, in the wake of Serious
Case Reviews, inspire hope. Nonetheless, the narratives associated with being the
victim  of  crime  for  those  who  have  experienced  mental  and  emotional  distress
remain distressingly similar, including; lack of awareness of criminality, feelings of
responsibility for the crime, shame, lack of confidence in disclosing to professionals
and confusion about whom to approach. The concept of double deviance potentially
provides these individuals, and those in positions of social power, with the means to
understand  how  personal  suffering  can  be  socially  constructed.  Conceptualising
these narratives as a form of testimonial and/or hermeneutical injustice necessitates
consideration of what is required to work in this area and provides a more nuanced
understanding of the debilitating effects of epistemic injustice. 
Pettitt and colleagues have shed light on a jarring image of conditions of less-
eligibility  in  various  aspects  of  the  criminal  justice  process.  Indeed,  Fricker’s
analyses utilised here have aided in establishing a conceptual thoroughfare by which
aspects of experience and treatment can be traced. Whilst criminal justice agencies
continue to attempt to address shortcomings of the past, failures appear to prevail in
crime victim territories. We see evidence, particularly in the mental health domain, of
attempts  to  counter  negative  treatment  and  experience  by  the  State  through  a
growing influence of identity politics. Similarly, critical voices emerging from crime
victims’ movements have gradually become more pronounced. However, as can be
seen there is room for much more to be done. The denial of any semblance of justice
for crime victims who experience mental and emotional distress is a pressing matter
for  reform as  it  represents  an  indictment  of  policy  failure  and  a  criminal  justice
system which  remains  burdened by  behaviours  that  promote  disenfranchisement
and marginalisation. 
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As Carel and Kidd (2014) reflect, recommendations to ameliorate the effects
of epistemic injustices are a priority for services of the State. The potential for the
criminal justice system to perpetuate conditions of social injustice has been shown
here. Indeed, the examples unearthed by Pettitt et al (2013) illustrate a neglect of
recognition  of  empowerment  that  constitutes  choice,  influence  and  control  (see
World Health Organization, 2010). Whilst work is still  being undertaken to ensure
that  criminal  justice  processes  and  policies  develop  on  a  trajectory  of  victim-
sensitivity, the nature of crime victims as not a homogenous group requires further
realisation.  Enabling  rather  than  disabling  policy  and  agency  interventions  are
required  as  a  matter  of  urgency  in  order  to  protect  vulnerable  individuals  from
discrimination and abuses of a system. Creating the conditions (not just policy and
rhetoric)  whereby  voices  can  be  heard,  respected  and  opinions  held  with  equal
weight to others has the potential to advance services that appear bedevilled with
both formal and informal barriers.
This  study  therefore  owes  much  to  Fricker’s  philosophical  thesis;  what
remains unclear, however, is not so much whether initiatives established to support
advocates and intermediaries working in this domain, will provide effective support
and a voice for people with experience of mental and emotional distress in the event
they also become victims of crime, but whether these people will be believed in the
first place, and more significantly, what happens if they are not.
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